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ABSTRACT 
Safety incentive programs have been a controversial topic for many years. Many 
believe that they help motivate workers to stay safe while others argue that workers 
should not be bribed to be safe and that workers are pressured to not report injuries. The 
costs of such programs can be high and may or may not be worth it. 
The goal of this study is to determine if the safety incentive programs that 
companies are using are cost effective or not and if they do work to reduce injuries. A 
case study of two different companies using two different safety incentive programs was 
conducted by using the following sets of data: annual numbers of OSHA recordable and 
lost time incidents, incident and severity rates, annual costs of their safety incentive 
programs, annual workers' compensation costs (paid losses, not premiums), and indirect 
costs of their programs. 
Company A has very low workers' compensation costs as well as incident and 
severity rates, and OSHA recordable and lost time cases. Company A showed no 
correlation between the cost of the safety incentive program and any of the data sets. 
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Company B, however, did show negative correlations between workers' compensation 
costs and the number of OSHA recordable cases versus the costs of the incentive 
programs. Surprisingly, however, Company B showed a positive correlation between the 
number of lost time cases and the cost of the incentive program. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
Manufacturers and construction companies are always looking for new ways to 
keep employees safe. Such companies must comply with strict federal or state 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations, Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) regulations, National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 
guidelines and International Standards Organization (ISO) controls. Some companies find 
it hard to make their employees realize how important it is for them to work safely. 
Simple injuries such as a cut or a muscle strain can end up costing the company 
thousands of dollars in workers' compensation, medical expenses, lost time, and loss of 
production. According to Safety Pays, OSHA's injury calculation cost tool, a muscle 
strain can cost $13,079, a laceration can cost $6055, while a more serious injury like 
carpal tunnel can cost $1 8,271. One way that companies are trying to increase safety 
compliance is through the use of safety incentive programs. 
Statement ofthe Problem 
Safety incentive programs are a growing trend throughout many different 
industries. They are also very controversial. Proponents of safety incentive programs 
believe that they help motivate workers to stay safe. Others argue that workers should not 
be bribed to be safe and that workers are pressured to not report injuries. The costs of 
such programs are high, and depending on one's perspective, the costs of such programs 
may or may not be worth it. Questions that influence this perspective are: Do safety 
incentive programs pressure employees to under-report injuries? What effects do safety 
incentive programs have on workers' compensation costs? 
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The research question here is: What effects do safety incentive programs have on 
performance standards such as OSHA recordable and lost time accidents, incident and 
severity rates, or workers' compensation costs, and do these changes outweigh the cost of 
the incentive program? This question is important because it can determine if such a 
program is beneficial and cost effective. 
If a safety incentive program does work, a company should see decreases in its 
OSHA recordable and loss time injuries, workers' compensation costs, and incident and 
severity rates. The monetary savings from these variables should be greater than the cost 
of the incentive program itself. Or are injuries being hidden and the numbers only hiding 
a bigger issue? If this is true, then the injuries that arise may be more severe than they 
should have been if they had been reported promptly. 
Purpose of the Study 
The goal of this study is to determine if the safety incentive programs that 
companies are using are cost effective or not and if they do work to reduce injuries. This 
study will look at the different programs used by two different companies and compare 
them. This case study will look at how each program is designed and utilized, then it will 
look at whether their individual programs are cost effective or not. This study is 
important because it may help a company determine if a safety incentive program truly is 
cost effective and worthwhile to implement such a program. 
Individual case studies will look at standardized costs of incentive programs year 
after year. The annual costs for workers' compensation, not including premiums, will be 
looked at to determine whether the safety incentive program has caused these costs to 
decrease over time. OSHA recordable and loss time cases as well as incident rates and 
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severity rates will also be studied to see if the incentive programs have had decreasing 
affects on them as well. Indirect costs will be analyzed. The issue of non-reporting 
injuries will also be taken into account. 
Definition of Terms 
Correlation CoefJicient: Measures the extent to which two continuous variables 
are linearly related. 
Incident Rate: (Number of OSHA Recordable Incidents x 200,000) / (Number of 
Hours Worked) 
OSHA Lost Time Injury: A work-related injury or illness resulting in days away 
from work. 
OSHA Recordable: A work-related injury or illness resulting in death, days away 
from work, restricted work or job transfer, medical treatment beyond first aid, or 
loss of consciousness. 
P-Value: Tells if a correlation coefficient is significantly different from zero. 
Severity Rate: (Number of lost work days x 200,000) / (Number of Hours 
Worked) 
This study does have its limitations. The limitations of this study are: 
1. The data in this study was received from voluntary participants from two 
companies in the Midwest. 
2. It is often difficult to identify all costs and benefits of safety incentive 
programs. 
3. It can be hard to quantify pros and cons of safety incentive programs. 
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Chapter 11: Literature Review 
In terms of literature available on the subject, there are two main categories that 
one finds published. First are articles that discuss the programs' pros and cons. Another 
important category to look at is the actual costs that go into safety incentive programs. 
Some of the costs are obvious, while others are indirect or hidden. Are safety incentive 
programs really saving companies money? Each category has been written on by various 
industry journals and magazines. 
Pros 
Proponents of incentive programs say that incentives build and maintain 
employee interest in working safely and act as a motivator for employees to work more 
safely (Prichard, 200 1). Incentive programs are a way for companies to show their 
employees that they care about them and that they work in a safe manner. According to 
Buck Peavy, president of Peavy Performance Systems, "In theory, we shouldn't have to 
have incentive programs to motivate people to work safely. In reality, rewards and 
recognition will boost safe behavior and motivate people," (Smith, 2002). For many 
companies, however, it is easier to reward employees for 90 days working without a lost- 
time accident than to measure what employees did to support or improve safety. 
One of the main goals of safety incentive programs is to cut down on fraudulent 
workers' compensation claims. Proponents feel that rewards and recognition proactively 
deter many fraudulent claims. According to Flanders and Goldberg (2001): 
If an employee is injured at home, it is to his benefit to report it as an on-the- 
job injury. There are no deductibles, co-insurance or HMOs to deal with in the 
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workers' compensation system. Also lost work days are paid for, and there is 
a potential for disability payments. (p. 47). 
Reducing workers' compensation costs or OSHA recordable or lost time injuries 
is often the main reason company's choose to implement safety incentive programs. One 
company was able to reduce their workers compensation costs from over $300,000 in 
2000 to about $20,000 in 2004. Another company that implemented a program saw their 
incident rate drop from 18.97 in 1999 to .83 in 2004 (Cable, 2005). 
Restaurant gift cards are a popular type of reward for incentive programs. One of 
the main positive factors about restaurant gift cards is its ability for the recipient to share 
it with hisher family or friends. This also tends to lead family or friends to encourage the 
participant with the incentive program (Expand the Menu, 2006). 
Cons 
Opponents say that safety incentive programs are a form of bribery. Many believe 
these programs arise when safety professionals do not really know how to reduce 
accidents so they resort to bribery (Prichard, 200 1). This can be a manipulative attempt to 
"cook the books" and often does little to change actual in-the-field behavior. These 
incentives often only secure temporary compliance as long as workers see a direct 
connection between the action and the reward. Employees can quickly learn the rules to 
the program and manipulate the system to minimize the changes needed while 
maximizing their gains at the expense of the program. Human behavior research has 
shown that when people are led to think about what they will get for doing a task, they 
typically do it less well and/or lose interest in it (2001). 
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The major concern with safety incentive programs is the non-reporting of injuries. 
Even major proponents of safety incentive programs can agree that safety incentives can 
discourage incident reporting if they are not administered properly (Miozza & Wyld, 
2002). Employees may feel pressured not to report injuries because they fear doing so 
would ruin their coworkers' chances of winning the incentives (Atkinson, 2000). Under- 
reporting is usually a symptom of management that is not committed to a safe workplace 
(Flanders & Lawrence Jr., 1999). This can show that management is simply concerned 
with reducing workers' compensation costs at the expense of their employees' health and 
safety. In order for such programs to work, management has to buy into the programs and 
they must be involved (Expanding the Menu, 2006). Some companies have taken this 
into consideration when developing their incentive programs and require employees to 
sign a waiver that says if they fail to report a work-related injury, they could lose their job 
(Cable, 2005). 
According to Downing and Norton (2004), another problem is focusing strictly on 
reducing accident rates by eliminating unsafe behavior is that it is reactive rather than 
proactive. Once rates go down, management tends to cut funding for incentive programs. 
Then the problems usually reoccur, causing a cyclical effect. Using a proactive or 
problem-solving approach involving both employees and management, the cycle of 
repeated problems can be eliminated. Also, a company must have a good safety program 
to begin with. A good incentive program will not make a bad safety program better 
(2004). 
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Costs 
Costs of such programs can be staggering. It is estimated that to break even on 
effective incentive programs, companies must see an 8 to 10% reduction in their workers' 
compensation claims (Smith, 2002). This is very important information for safety 
managers to think about because upper management, especially the CEO or plant 
manager, is looking at only one thing - the bottom line. 
Incentive experts recommend spending no more than 50 percent of the savings 
that an incentive program produces (Toomey, 1999). Costs of such programs should 
consider the program objectives, the number of participants, costs of training/education, 
cost of awards, cost of administration, cost of promotion, and tracking. Once a budget is 
established, experts recommend the following budget allocation: 60-70% on awards, 10% 
on training, 10% on promotion, and no more than 10% for administration (1 999.) 
Incentive programs at some companies spend hundreds of thousands of dollars on 
prizes like cars, cruises, or large cash prizes. Others throw lavish safety or recognition 
parties that can cost in excess of $60,000 (Smith, 2002). Recently one company gave 
away a 2006 Pontiac Solstice worth $27,000 and the previous month a $1200 plasma 
television was given away because the company did not have any recordable accidents 
for those months (Simmons, 2006). The industry standard is often based at 1-2% of an 
employee's annual wages (Downing & Norton, 2004). 
Administrative costs can be high because a lot of detailed work must be done to 
keep these programs running smoothly. The person administering the program and the 
company need to know going in what the potential costs will be (Expanding the Menu, 
2006). 
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In addition, there is also a hidden cost of incentive programs that many companies 
frequently overlook. The companies or the employees must pay taxes on incentives that 
are awarded. According to Smith (2002), in one case, a South Carolina life insurance 
company awarded employees $65,000 worth of $5 and $10 gift certificates, assuming 
they wouldn't be taxed because it wasn't cash. Wrong, said the IRS, which stated the gift 
certificates were disguised compensation, and the company had to pick up the tab for the 
interest, penalties, and legal fees totaling an additional $180,000. Another company 
rewarded employees with $100,000 in gift certificates and later had to pay an extra 
$90,000 in taxes. Bill Sims Jr., of the Bill Sims Co. Inc, states that the average amount 
per employee should be somewhere in the $100 rage. Sims said "Can you really expect to 
change behavior by spending $2 per person per year? I don't think so," (2002). 
Another serious cost of incentive programs is the recurrence of avoidable 
accidents as a result of failure to identify and correct problems, also referred to by quality 
managers as the cost of non-conformance (Goldberg, 1998). Failure to report an injury 
means that the cause of the accident remains uninvestigated and uncorrected, and as a 
result, the causes of "hidden" accidents and near misses remain and may produce more 
serious problems in the future. Companies that are truly committed to reducing safety and 
health costs and exposures rely on all of their injury report data to identify trends and 
proactively make changes to prevent any recurrences (Atkinson, 2000). Employers who 
use traditional incentive programs usually see reductions in their OSHA recordables, but 
their serious injury and fatality rates remain the same. The only thing that is changing is a 
decrease in the reporting of less serious injuries. If more serious accidents do occur, as a 
Safety Incentives 9 
result of failing to identify hazards, the costs could be much worse than what they would 
have been earlier on had the hazard been fixed or eliminated. 
Workers who do not report injuries right away can have serious difficulty 
receiving workers' compensation benefits, including both medical costs andlor lost 
wages, if the injury becomes worse and it is reported later on (Frederick & Lessin, 2000). 
These costs are then shifted to the individual worker's health insurance, and these days 
workers are paying higher and higher shares of these shares anyway. With fewer claims, 
this can translate into lower workers' compensation premiums for the employers. Some 
employers might see this as a good thing, but it is only masking the problem. Companies 
who discourage the reporting of injuries could also face future lawsuits by employees for 
medical compensation for injuries that went unreported and were later denied by 
workers' compensation. 
Hiding injuries could also lead to OSHA fines. For example, Flanders and 
Lawrence (1 999) reported that an Ohio firm was cited under 1904.2(a), the recordkeeping 
standard, for coercing employees to ignore medical advice in order to falsify records. The 
company had a bonus pool that rewarded employees with excellent safety records and in 
return they were pressuring employees not to report their injuries. OSHA is trying to send 
a strong message that result-based incentive programs must be structured in a way as to 
not encourage employees to under-report injuries. 
Obviously, there are many costs associated with incentive programs. Because of 
the level of effort required to establish and properly execute a safety incentive program, 
and the high level of uncertainty regarding the return on investment, it makes much more 
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economic sense to dedicate resources to activities that have a clear and unambiguous 
positive effect on safety (Prichard, 2001). 
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Chapter 111: Methodology 
In order to find out if safety incentive programs are cost effective and beneficial, 
several companies of various sizes located the Midwest were contacted and asked about 
their safety incentive programs. Data on the type of safety incentive program and annual 
costs associated with the program were collected. Annual workers' compensation costs 
(not including premiums), annual numbers of OSHA recordable and lost time injuries, 
and incident and severity rates were collected in order to show trends and define the 
population. 
Subject Selection and Description 
This case study is aimed to describe the various types of programs in use by 
companies and their effectiveness. Several companies were contacted via phone and 
email regarding their safety incentive programs. Of those, two agreed to share their data 
and information regarding their incentive programs. 
Data Collection Procedures 
The safety and health contacts for each company were asked for the following 
sets of data: annual numbers of OSHA recordable and lost time incidents, incident and 
severity rates, annual costs of their safety incentive programs, annual workers' 
compensation costs (paid losses, not premiums), and indirect costs of their programs. The 
number of years of data required was dependent on the number of years the safety 
incentive programs have been in place. 
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Data Analysis 
Analysis on this data was done by using charts created in Microsoft Excel. 
General graphs were created to show trends. Scatter plots were used to show if there was 
any correlation, positive or negative, between data sets. 
Minitab 13.3 1 was used to calculate correlation coefficients and P-values in order 
to validate any correlation found through the scatter plots. Correlation coefficients range 
in value from -1 to +1, and the strength depends on the absolute value of the coefficient. 
The larger the absolute value, the stronger the linear relationship. The direction of the 
relationship depends on the sign of the coefficient. P-values in this analysis had an a- 
level of 0.05. Any results less than 0.05 mean that the correlation is different from zero, 
while values greater than 0.05 mean the correlation is different from zero. 
Limitations 
Not all companies use safety incentive programs, therefore, it was necessary to 
contact only companies that the researcher knew used such programs. Several companies 
also declined to take part in the study, and therefore, the population of this study is not 
fully representative of all companies that use incentive programs. It is also difficult to 
fully identify all costs and benefits associated with safety incentive programs. It can be 
hard to quantify the pros and cons of such programs. 
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Chapter IV: Results 
This study was done to see if incentive programs are cost effective and beneficial. 
Two companies with safety incentive programs were used as case studies to show the 
different types of safety incentive programs that are currently being used as well as to see 
how these incentive programs have affected certain criteria. 
Item Analysis 
Company A 
Company A institutes a program that is fairly inexpensive, and they have very low 
incident and severity rates. Company A has a safety incentive plan based on positive 
actions toward safety rather than bad things not happening. Employees have been very 
responsive to it since it began in 199 1. It is based on a quarterly system. There are nine 
departments and each month each department must complete and report a safety 
inspection. Each department must also complete and report on a safety meeting held in 
the lSt and 3rd month of the quarter. A facility meeting including all departments is held in 
the second month and 100% participation is required. There is also a Safety Committee 
meeting each quarter. The Safety Committee tracks the progress for each department on a 
chart. The incentive is a safety lunch for all employees after completion of all the 
quarterly goals. 
Food is seen as a big incentive to the employees of Company A. The incentive is 
theirs to lose. It is easy for employees to achieve and it keeps safety awareness high as 
well. No one wants to blow the lunch for the entire company, which would be hard to live 
down. Company A averages about one recordable incident a year and these injuries are 
usually minor cumulative trauma disorders (CTDs). 
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The main limitation to the incentive program used by Company A is that entire 
safety lunch could be affected by one person's actions. If one person misses a safety 
meeting, the entire company will miss out on the safety lunch. It could be more 
appropriate if those workers who do not comply with the program are left out of the 
lunch, while those who qualify are rewarded. 
Indirect costs associated with the safety incentive program for Company A are 
estimated at $50 per quarter. This mostly involves checking that all components were 
complied with and coordinating the employee luncheon. At $50 per quarter, annual costs 
would be $200. This is an extremely small amount and very little administration is 
necessary for this program. 
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Table 1. Company A Worker's Compensation Costs vs. Incentive Program CQNS 
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Table &. Company A OSHA Recordable and Lost Time Cases 
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Table 7. Company A Correlation of Workers' Compensation Costs and Incentive Program 
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Table 9. Company A Correlation Between OSHA Recordable and Lost Time Cases and 
Incentive Program Costs 
Company A Correlation Between OSHA 
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Incentive Program Costs 
Company A has a consistently low cost for its safety incentive program. The 
program costs have slowly been increasing over time, usually averaging a change of 
around $200 per year, except for 2005, which was up $1000 over 2004's cost of $2500 to 
$3500. There have not been aay other large jumps, nor any decreases in the casts of the 
safety incentive program. 
The workers' co-on costs of Company A are typically very low. Only 
three years have seen worked compensation costs above $1000. This occurred in 1996, 
1996, and 2001. In 2001, there was an all time high of workers' compensation costs of 
$24,354. This particular year saw four OSHA recordables with two lost time incidents. 
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This included 59 lost work days, the most they have lost within the past 14 years 
combined. 
Company A has very low incident rates, with occasional small peaks. These peaks 
occurred in 1996 and 2001 when the incident rates rose to 7.06 and 7.05 respectively. 
This also carries over into the severity rates for Company A. Company A has had a 
severity rate of 0.00 in all but three years in 1995, 1996, and 2001. In addition, Company 
A averages 1.2 OSHA recordables per year and averages only 0.3 lost time incidents per 
year. 
According to Table 7, there was no correlation between the workers' 
compensation costs and the cost of the incentive program for Company A. The 
correlation coefficient for the incentive program costs and the workers' compensation 
costs was 0.055, which was very low and substantiates a weak linear relationship. The P- 
value was 0.853 shows that the coefficient correlation is not significantly different that 
zero. As noted above, Company A typically has very low annual costs for workers' 
compensation, usually below $1000. Even though the cost of their incentive program has 
been increasing steadily, the workers' compensation costs have stayed the same. 
Severity and incentive rates also have no correlation to the incentive program 
costs. This is confirmed by correlation coefficients of 0.021 and -0.092, respectively. 
Again, these rates are usually very low and are not affected by the costs of the incentive 
program. There were two outliers for the severity rate at 33.52 and 104.03. These results 
are show in Table 8. 
OSHA recordable and lost time cases do not have a correlation to the incentive 
program costs as shown in Table 9. The annual totals for OSHA recordable are always 
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less than or equal to four, while lost time cases are less than or equal to two. The numbers 
are not dependent on what was spent on the incentive program. The incident rate for 
Company A had the highest coefficient correlation value of -0.146, although this is still a 
low result. 
Company B 
Company B uses an incentive program with two separate aspects. The first part to 
the program is a safety point system. Points are awarded to eligible employees based on 
regular hours, over-time hours are not included. Eligible employees are all regular full- 
time and regular part-time employees. Temporary employees and summer employees are 
not eligible. One-tenth (1 I1  0) of a point is earned for each regular hour worked and each 
point is worth $0.15. This allows employees to earn four points for every 40 hours 
worked. There is a maximum of 208 safety points in any calendar year. Overall, there is a 
650 point maximum accrual. If the maximum accrual limit is reached, safety points will 
not be award until an employee's balance falls below the limit. 
The safety points can be used to purchase a wide variety of recognition awards, 
food products, or protective footwear. Safety points can be lost at varying amounts for 
several reasons. 
150 points for a lost time OSHA recordable incident 
100 points for an OSHA recordable incident 
50 points for receiving a written safety warning 
50 points for have 2 incidents within 12 months 
It should be noted, that in regards to losing points for an OSHA recordable or lost time 
incident, the points are only deducted if the incident was the result of an unsafe act, 
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horseplay or intentional act. For example, if an employee had an OSHA recordable 
incident for an ergonomic injury such as carpal tunnel, the employee would not lose any 
points. This aspect of point deduction is fairly new to Company B. It was instituted 
within the past 2 years. Previously, there was no way for an employee to lose points, 
everyone gained them regardless. 
The second part of Company B's incentive program involves safety goals that are 
set annually by the Safety Steering Committee. This is a committee made up of managers 
and supervisors that oversees safety issues and is an advisory committee for the regular 
Safety and Health Committee. The Safety Steering Committee sets a monthly recordable 
incident goal. In 2005, for example, the goal was 2 or less. If the company had 2 or less 
OSHA recordables in a month, the employees would receive a "Safety Treat". This 
involves some sort of food item such as, cookies, bars, or muffins. If there are zero 
recordable incidents incurred for two consecutive months, some type of lunch is served to 
all employees. 
The safety incentive program used by Company B has several limitations. First of 
all, the safety points accrue at a very slow rate. With accruing only four points per week, 
it can be had for an employee to become very excited about the program. The maximum 
annual accrual of 208 is only valued at $3 1.20. For an employee to purchase something 
substantial, it can take them several years to accrue the needed amount of points. 
Another limitation is that there is no other way for employees to gain points. 
Employees might be more motivated to become involved in safety if they could be 
rewarded in some fashion for their efforts. One example would be members of the Safety 
and Health Committee should receive an extra amount of points per year for their 
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participation. Another option would be to give out extra points for safety suggestions that 
are implemented. 
There is also no recognition for employees in regards to safety. Company B has a 
company newsletter that each month could recognize safe employees, or recognition 
could be given on a display board in the main lobby or lunch room, so that others would 
be able to see their co-workers accomplishments. 
It has also been reported to the Safety and Health Committee of Company B that 
there are concerns regarding the non-reporting of injuries. Several committee members 
have stated that employees are scared to report things because they are afraid to lose their 
points. This shows there is a communication gap between administers of the program and 
some employees. Employees are told about the safety points program when they become 
eligible for the program. It should be noted that Company B employs a high number of 
immigrants who do not speak English, and in fact, 16 different languages are spoken 
within the facility. One probable cause for the communication gap is the language barrier. 
While most of the English speaking employees know they will not lose their points for 
reporting injuries or unsafe conditions, it seems that many of the non-English speaking 
employees are confused by the system and it could be causing them to not report injuries 
or incidents. 
Indirect costs for Company B's safety incentive program can be considered rather 
high. The Safety & Environmental Coordinator estimates that approximately 12 hours a 
month are spent on administration of the program. At $20 per hour, this equals $240 per 
month, or $2880 per year, designated for program administration. In 2005, Company B 
spent $1 3,297 on its incentive program while spending approximately $2880 on 
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administrative costs. This would be a total of 21.7% of the budget in 2005. According to 
Toomey (1999), no more than 10% should be spent on administration of a program. In 
addition, this means that 12 hours of produotion time are taken away from the Safety & 
Environmental Coordinator. 
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Table 15. Company B OSHA Recordable and Lost Time Cases 
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Table 16. Company B Correlation Between Workers' G o m p t i o n  Costs and Incentive 
I'ragrm Costs 
Company B CamhatSosl Between Workers' 
CompematiQn C.osts and Incentive Program Costs 
$IO.OM) $15,000 45,000 
Innentiwe Program Costs 
Table 17. Company B Codtion Between Severity and Incident Rates md Incentive 
Program Costs 
Company B Correlation Between Severity and 
lncident Rate and Cost of Incentive Program 
45 
40 
35 
30 
9 25 
2 20 A Incident  ate 
15 
.8u*)RI 
10 
5 
0 
So &000 $10.000 $15,000 $20,WO $25,000 
Cobt of IncenWle Program 
---- ~~ ~~-~:==- 
, .: 
. . 
- 
.  .,. . .- ~ ~ . ,. . . . ,Safety Incentives 36 
~ ~. 
- ,, 
. , 
. ,  - .  .. 
. : ... . . 
. . .,
Table 1'8. Company B C o t ~ e W  Between OSHA Recordable and Lost T- Cases and 
. . 
W t i v e  Program Costs 
Company B Correlation Between OSHA 
Recor&able and Lost Time Cases and Cost of 
Incentive Program 
+ Lwt Kime Cape, 
19tlA FbmdaMe L!rl 
$5,000 Sl0,OOO $15,000 $20,000 $25,000 
Cast: of lmntlye Program 
Company B's eeertg ofits immtive program have mostly trended upwards from 
. . 2001-2004, although 2005 ssv a 2Wo k e a s e  in costs h m  $18,462 in 2004 to $13,297 
~. in 2005. There was an initial hi& peak in 2000 of $20,841 followed by a low of S1%,653 
in2001. TBis can be attrhted to the fact that employees would have had to *,a while 
to aeamulate enough points to p u r c b  items. The year 2000 saw a large influx of 
, . 
. .. . . 
orders for those employees who wanted to use np their points, while 2001 then saw a 
1.- decline in spending due to ttre faot that the employees had spent most of their points the 
previous year and again had to wait to ac~:umulate points. Since then there has been more 
of a steady level ofeosts spant =the incentive program. 
, . ~  
: , 
. : 
., .. 
. ~ .  . , 
-, .: 
., 
Safety Incentives 37 
The workers' compensation costs for Company B tend to vary from year to year. 
In 2001 there was a sharp increase up to $280,866, and again in 2003 with costs of 
$179,280. The safety incentive program has clearly not affected Company B's workers' 
compensation costs. 
From 2001-2004 Company B saw a decline in its incident rates. In 2005 there was 
a slight increase from 3.3 in 2004 to 4.8 in 2005. The severity rates, on the other hand, 
show a different trend. Severity rates for Company B have a somewhat upward trend. 
There was a large spike in 2004 with a severity rate of 41.8, followed by a decrease to 9.8 
in 2005. In 2004 Company B had a large increase in the numbers of days lost, up to 223 
from 88 in 2003, causing the large jump in the severity rate. 
In general, Company B averages 3 1.7 OSHA recordables per year, while it 
averages 5.1 lost time incidents per year. Company B did see a drop in OSHA 
recordables in 2004 with only 16, although this is off set by the high number of lost work 
days that year. 2005 was also lower than average with 25 OSHA recordables. Initially, 
neither the number of OSHA recordables nor the lost time incidents seem to be affected 
by the safety incentive program as neither has seen significant decreases or downward 
trends. 
Table 16 shows the possibility of a negative correlation between the cost of the 
incentive program and the workers' compensation costs. There is a slight downward 
trend, showing that as the cost of the program went up, workers' compensation costs 
tended to go down. There were a few outliers shown on the graph, which means the 
correlation could possibly be there, although further data would be necessary to find out 
if there is any linear correlation. The correlation coefficient for these two variables was 
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-0.285 with a P-value of 0.536 which both suggest there is not that strong of a linear 
relationship as the scatter plot may suggest. 
Severity and incident rates did not have any correlation in regards to how much 
was spent on the incentive programs. Table 17 shows that most of the rates are all within 
the same range, along with a few outliers, particularly the severity rate of 41.8 in 2004. 
The correlation coefficient for the incident rate was -0.601, suggesting somewhat of a 
negative linear relationship. Although overall, the cost of the incentive program seems to 
have little effect on Company B's severity or incident rates. 
One of the more surprising results involves the OSHA recordable and lost time 
cases. Table 18 shows that a negative correlation exists between the number of OSHA 
recordable cases and the cost of the incentive program. There was one outlier in this 
category in which there were 34 OSHA recordable cases in the year when over $20,000 
was spent on the incentive program. Here, the correlation coefficient was -0.579, which 
supports the negative linear correlation between the OSHA recordable cases and the cost 
of the incentive program. This downward trend leads us to believe that as the cost of the 
incentive program went up, the number of OSHA recordable cases went down. 
On the other hand, however, Table 18 shows a positive relationship between lost 
time cases and incentive program costs. The correlation coefficient of 0.855 &d the P- 
value of 0.014 strongly suggest there is a strong positive linear relationship. Of all the 
data sets from both companies, this set showed the strongest results of all. This would 
suggest that as more was spent on the incentive program the number of lost time cases 
actually increased. This result is not expected. It would normally be assumed that as the 
number of OSHA recordables decrease, as noted above, so would the number of lost time 
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cases. This suggests that while Company B may have managed to cut down on their 
frequency of incidents, they have not addressed the severity. However, it should be noted 
that since the severity rate had no correlation to the incentive program costs, this may or 
may not be true. 
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Chapter V: Conclusions and Recommendations 
Discussion of Results 
,The safety incentive program currently used by Company A has not shown to 
have any correlation or effect on workers' compensation costs, severity and incident 
rates, or OSHA recordable or lost time cases. This is supported by the scatter diagrams as 
well as the correlation coefficients and P-values. Company A has very low annual costs 
for workers' compensation and their numbers for severity and incident rates as well as 
OSHA recordable and lost time cases are extremely low. 
The program used by Company A is inexpensive and requires very little 
administration or indirect costs. The program in question is mostly likely more beneficial 
for keeping up employee moral. It would seem that Company A would have similar 
results without having such a program in place. 
Company B did show signs of some correlation in a few different categories. 
Table 16 possibly shows a slight negative correlation between the cost of the incentive 
program and workers' compensation costs. Generally, in the years when Company B 
spent more on their incentive program, their workers' compensation costs went down. 
There was also negative correlation between the number of OSHA recordables 
and the cost of the incentive programs. Again, when the cost of the program went up, 
OSHA recordables were generally less than when spending on the program was lower. 
The surprise correlation was with the lost time cases. Company B actually saw the 
number of loss time cases rise as the cost of the incentive program went up. This would 
not normally be expected but was supported by the correlation coefficient of 0.855 and a 
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P-value of 0.014. It also should be noted that neither the severity nor the incident rate had 
any correlation to the cost of the incentive program. 
Limitations 
This case study was limited to companies with safety incentive programs in the 
Midwest who were willing to share their company data. Several companies declined to 
take part in the study, and therefore, the population of this study is not fully 
representative of all companies that use incentive programs. It is also difficult to fully 
identify all costs and benefits associated with safety incentive programs. It can be hard to 
quantify the pros and cons of such programs. 
Conclusions 
Company A's safety program does not show to be having any affect on its 
workers' compensation costs, severity and incident rates, or OSHA recordable and lost 
time cases. Since the company does not spend much money on the incentive program in 
the first place, they are not losing much, if any, money on the program. For example, in 
2004, Company A spent $2500 on the program, while workers' compensation costs were 
only $41 8.48. The difference is only $2081.52. 
Company B's program did, however, show some signs of negative correlation 
between the workers' compensation costs and the cost of the incentive program, meaning 
as the cost of the program went up, workers' compensation costs went down. This can be 
seen in Table 16. This is one of the primary reasons that companies choose to implement 
safety incentive programs. 
A negative correlation was seen with the number of OSHA recordable cases, and 
surprisingly, there was a positive correlation with the number of lost time cases. The 
Safety Incentives 42 
reduction of OSHA recordable cases is a good sign. However, showing a positive 
correlation with the lost time cases needs further attention. 
One possible reason for the increase of lost time cases could be the non-reporting 
of injuries. Delaying the reporting of injuries can be harmful because once they finally 
are reported they can be more severe since they have not been treated and may require 
lost days. Frederick & Lessin (2000) also stated that the costs of unreported injuries are 
then shifted to the individual worker's health insurance. So while workers' compensation 
costs might be decreasing, regular health insurance costs for Company B may be rising. It 
should also be noted, that according to Atkinson (2000), not reporting injuries means that 
the cause of the accident remains uninvestigated and uncorrected, and as a result, this 
may produce more serious problems in the future. Companies committed to reducing 
safety and health costs and exposures rely on all of their injury report data to identify 
trends and make changes accordingly to prevent any recurrence. 
Recommendations 
In order to do a more precise comparison of data, further studies should look at 
numbers for workers' compensation costs, incident and severity rates, and OSHA 
recordable and lost time cases prior to the implementation of the program for each 
company. This would be beneficial for both Company A and B. This way one would be 
able to more accurately judge the affect a safety incentive program has had on an 
organization and how cost effective it is. 
In the case of Company B, it would also be beneficial to have a few more years' 
worth of data. Currently, there was only data from 1999-2005. The lack of long-term data 
makes it difficult to properly judge trends within the data. It would be recommended to 
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review Company B in a few years' time to see if addition years' data can help to more 
clearly define trends and correlations. 
It would also be recommended by the author to look at other factors such as the 
cost of regular health insurance. Obviously health care costs grow higher and higher each 
year, but especially with the case of Company B, it would be interesting to see if there 
has been any changes in the number of claims annually for regular health insurance. This 
could help identify if work related injuries are truly being under-reported. If there was a 
significant jump in the past few years, this might let us know if people are putting their 
injuries under their personal health insurance or not. 
An additional study should be done to investigate the non-reporting of injuries, 
especially regarding Company B. Something such as a focus-group or an employee 
survey could be used to determine if in fact injuries are being under-reported. It is hard to 
judge for sure if injuries are not being reported unless there is direct information from the 
employees themselves. 
The author also recommends doing additional case studies on a number of other 
companies from various industries to study the types of safety incentive programs that are 
being used. It would be more beneficial to have a larger population in order to see what 
kinds of affects safety incentive programs are having for those companies that are using 
them. 
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